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[This is part of a series exploring the Baseball Tarot.]
With its bevy of statistics and numbers tracked, it would surprise very few people that baseball is a game that seems good for simulation purposes. Statistical models are usually in play for more than just fantasy league players trying to make decisions about who to draft and trade - the teams themselves are running similar models to try and determine which if their players is going to be helpful, which need to be gotten rid of, and what kinds of roles need to be fulfilled if the team wants to compete for a playoff spot. Mathematics is the underpinning of baseball, and computers are really good at doing all sorts of complex mathematics to see whether or not a player is going to be valuable.
That's all very off-field material. On the field, maths and logic are just as important in determining defensive placement (and whether to use the shift or not), pitch selection, how big a lead to take, whether to steal, and whether to take, swing, or bunt. All of these factors interact with each other in myriad ways. A slow pitcher with a catcher that can get rid of a ball quickly is a different scenario than a fast pitcher with a slower catcher. A hitter with a tendency and a pitcher with a likelihood adjust their choices accordingly.
Prioritization is a huge part of the defensive decision tree. With runners on base, opportunities to get the lead runner out are a priority - except when the batted ball would result in two outs instead. Then you can give up a base, and sometimes even a run, in exchange for two outs. Except if the infield really needs to make sure that lead runner doesn't score the winning run - then you might only get one out, or none, so as to avoid losing the game. The outfield always attempts to deliver the ball back to the infield one base ahead of the lead runner any time they have to handle retrieving it, fly out or not. Force outs are preferable to tag outs, ground ball outs to fly ball outs (and strikeouts over all), and before every pitch is thrown, every defender knows what to do with the ball should it be batted their way, in the case of runners trying to take the next base and in the case of runners not trying to take the next base. They also know what to do if the ball is batted to a different defender - pitchers are often required to cover first base on balls batted to the defender normally covering first base. This can mean for a very interesting 3-6-1 (first base-shortstop-pitcher) double play if the defense can hustle fast enough to get everyone in place. Shortstop and second base trade off as to whom is covering second base on balls batted to the left or right side of the field, and whom is covering second base in case of a throw down to prevent a steal or attempt to pick off the runner, based on the situation and the batter at the plate.
The foundations of these heuristics are taught at the learning level, with practice scenarios repeated until the fielders are making correct decisions, even if their arm strength can't quite deliver the ball to the correct destination in a reasonable amount of time. It's why some of the chatter between defenders are reminders to themselves and others as to which decision tree to use for the upcoming batter. And then those decision trees end up having to account for the rare scenario, usually accompanied by a field-level below of "BUNT!"
A computer could very well simulate the entire decision tree that every player goes through on every pitch and accurately replicate most of the mental game as thoroughly as possible. The physical game, not as easily, but they're trying all the same, through increasingly sophisticated dice rolls and random number generation. The mental game is present for those that can read the signs, and if you're tapped in to that part of the game, even the mundane experiences give clues to the unfolding shape of the contest.
All of that goes into this card - Fielder's Choice. Officially, a Fielder's Choice is defined in Rule 2 as "the act of a fielder who handles a fair grounder and, instead of throwing to first base to put out the batter-runner, throws to another base in an attempt to put out a preceding runner." It's a way of statistically accounting for the presence of a batter on the bases on the scorecard without the official scorer having to credit them with a hit (which would raise their batting average). A Fielder's Choice is considered an official at-bat, so statistically, the batter is punished correctly for not hitting safely, even if they subsequently manage to get on base due to how the play unfolds.
For example, a batter who starts what would be a 6-4-3 double play but manages to beat the relay throw to first thanks to their speed on the basepaths or their teammate's work at disrupting the rhythm of the play (actual disruption of the play itself that doesn't give the defense a fair shot at making the play in the eyes of the umpire is interference, and will get the batter declared out) will be scored as a Fielder's Choice - the defensive player could have decided to put the batter out, and probably would have, but they chose to go after a higher-priority runner already on the base paths. In the cases of double plays, the batter might still end up getting out anyway based on further decisions, but the initial decision was to focus on something else.
As you might expect, the presence of this card is about making decisions. The artwork of the card itself depicts a fielder with the ball and in the motion of making a throw, with other fielders ready to receive that throw. The throwing fielder, however, is giving no body language as to which fielder they are going to throw to, and may, in fact, be hesitating just a little bit before delivering the ball, a hesitation that could be costly.
The upside of the card indicates choosing a course of action based on your understanding of the situation and following through on it. Even if you're not sure that the option you picked is the optimal one, you should at least be able to get an out from the decision or otherwise help your team. The option you choose may be different based on the scenarios that you choose, but at this point in the game, you hopefully have enough information about the state of play that you can confidently make a choice that will be helpful.
Which makes the downside of the card about indecision. Paralyzing indecision, of trying to choose between options where there is no clear indication as to where to go, or between competing options that are both loud and mutually exclusive. If you can't choose, try to determine why not. A lack of information can hopefully be remedied with research or questioning. Or applying what you already know to the situation at hand. Sometimes the decision is there, you just need to actually notice it.
Baseball is a game of choices, from the front office to the field of play. Even if only one specific thing actually gets recorded as something in the scorer's book. Seeing the decisions that lead to the current situation helps makes later decisions easier to make.
With its bevy of statistics and numbers tracked, it would surprise very few people that baseball is a game that seems good for simulation purposes. Statistical models are usually in play for more than just fantasy league players trying to make decisions about who to draft and trade - the teams themselves are running similar models to try and determine which if their players is going to be helpful, which need to be gotten rid of, and what kinds of roles need to be fulfilled if the team wants to compete for a playoff spot. Mathematics is the underpinning of baseball, and computers are really good at doing all sorts of complex mathematics to see whether or not a player is going to be valuable.
That's all very off-field material. On the field, maths and logic are just as important in determining defensive placement (and whether to use the shift or not), pitch selection, how big a lead to take, whether to steal, and whether to take, swing, or bunt. All of these factors interact with each other in myriad ways. A slow pitcher with a catcher that can get rid of a ball quickly is a different scenario than a fast pitcher with a slower catcher. A hitter with a tendency and a pitcher with a likelihood adjust their choices accordingly.
Prioritization is a huge part of the defensive decision tree. With runners on base, opportunities to get the lead runner out are a priority - except when the batted ball would result in two outs instead. Then you can give up a base, and sometimes even a run, in exchange for two outs. Except if the infield really needs to make sure that lead runner doesn't score the winning run - then you might only get one out, or none, so as to avoid losing the game. The outfield always attempts to deliver the ball back to the infield one base ahead of the lead runner any time they have to handle retrieving it, fly out or not. Force outs are preferable to tag outs, ground ball outs to fly ball outs (and strikeouts over all), and before every pitch is thrown, every defender knows what to do with the ball should it be batted their way, in the case of runners trying to take the next base and in the case of runners not trying to take the next base. They also know what to do if the ball is batted to a different defender - pitchers are often required to cover first base on balls batted to the defender normally covering first base. This can mean for a very interesting 3-6-1 (first base-shortstop-pitcher) double play if the defense can hustle fast enough to get everyone in place. Shortstop and second base trade off as to whom is covering second base on balls batted to the left or right side of the field, and whom is covering second base in case of a throw down to prevent a steal or attempt to pick off the runner, based on the situation and the batter at the plate.
The foundations of these heuristics are taught at the learning level, with practice scenarios repeated until the fielders are making correct decisions, even if their arm strength can't quite deliver the ball to the correct destination in a reasonable amount of time. It's why some of the chatter between defenders are reminders to themselves and others as to which decision tree to use for the upcoming batter. And then those decision trees end up having to account for the rare scenario, usually accompanied by a field-level below of "BUNT!"
A computer could very well simulate the entire decision tree that every player goes through on every pitch and accurately replicate most of the mental game as thoroughly as possible. The physical game, not as easily, but they're trying all the same, through increasingly sophisticated dice rolls and random number generation. The mental game is present for those that can read the signs, and if you're tapped in to that part of the game, even the mundane experiences give clues to the unfolding shape of the contest.
All of that goes into this card - Fielder's Choice. Officially, a Fielder's Choice is defined in Rule 2 as "the act of a fielder who handles a fair grounder and, instead of throwing to first base to put out the batter-runner, throws to another base in an attempt to put out a preceding runner." It's a way of statistically accounting for the presence of a batter on the bases on the scorecard without the official scorer having to credit them with a hit (which would raise their batting average). A Fielder's Choice is considered an official at-bat, so statistically, the batter is punished correctly for not hitting safely, even if they subsequently manage to get on base due to how the play unfolds.
For example, a batter who starts what would be a 6-4-3 double play but manages to beat the relay throw to first thanks to their speed on the basepaths or their teammate's work at disrupting the rhythm of the play (actual disruption of the play itself that doesn't give the defense a fair shot at making the play in the eyes of the umpire is interference, and will get the batter declared out) will be scored as a Fielder's Choice - the defensive player could have decided to put the batter out, and probably would have, but they chose to go after a higher-priority runner already on the base paths. In the cases of double plays, the batter might still end up getting out anyway based on further decisions, but the initial decision was to focus on something else.
As you might expect, the presence of this card is about making decisions. The artwork of the card itself depicts a fielder with the ball and in the motion of making a throw, with other fielders ready to receive that throw. The throwing fielder, however, is giving no body language as to which fielder they are going to throw to, and may, in fact, be hesitating just a little bit before delivering the ball, a hesitation that could be costly.
The upside of the card indicates choosing a course of action based on your understanding of the situation and following through on it. Even if you're not sure that the option you picked is the optimal one, you should at least be able to get an out from the decision or otherwise help your team. The option you choose may be different based on the scenarios that you choose, but at this point in the game, you hopefully have enough information about the state of play that you can confidently make a choice that will be helpful.
Which makes the downside of the card about indecision. Paralyzing indecision, of trying to choose between options where there is no clear indication as to where to go, or between competing options that are both loud and mutually exclusive. If you can't choose, try to determine why not. A lack of information can hopefully be remedied with research or questioning. Or applying what you already know to the situation at hand. Sometimes the decision is there, you just need to actually notice it.
Baseball is a game of choices, from the front office to the field of play. Even if only one specific thing actually gets recorded as something in the scorer's book. Seeing the decisions that lead to the current situation helps makes later decisions easier to make.
